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HAROLD TARRANT
In Illinois Classical Studies 11 (1986) 35-41, John Dillon presents material
from Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides in which he makes it clear
that Proclus knew of a work purporting to be by Zeno, which contained
forty logoi; this work was allegedly the one which "Zeno" had just read at
the opening of the main narrative of Plato's Parmenides (127c), and which
Socrates subsequently challenges (127d-30a). Dillon presents the same
material in his introduction to Proclus' In Parmenidem} Its relevance is no
longer confined to the Neoplatonists, since Dillon believes that it is
possible that the Forty Logoi "at least contained genuine material, though
perhaps worked over at a later date."'^ It threatens to have implications both
for Eleatic Studies and for the interpretation of the Parmenides itself.
I believe that the issue must be tackled again, not merely because of
Dillon's judiciously aporetic conclusion, but because I fear that there are
important points which have not yet been tackled. Firstly, from a passage
which is not included in Dillon's survey, but which seems to me to be
relevant, it appears that the allegedly Zenonian work was known to much
earlier, pre-Plotinian interpreters; and that they considered it important for
the interpretation of the hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides, at
least down to 155e and possibly beyond. This increases the potential
importance of the work, as well as marginally increasing its claim to be
genuine; at least it was not a Neoplatonic forgery.
Secondly, in spite of Proclus' apparent familiarity with it, it does not
seem to clarify for him Plato's rather puzzling reference to the "first
hypothesis of the first logos" at 127d7; one would have expected that
consultation of the relevant text of Zeno would have done so, and this might
be thought an obstacle to the belief that the work is what it purported to be.
Thirdly, there is a significant question of Proclus' independence: there
are some disturbing features about the historical material in this
commentary which are absent from his r/maeM.y-commentary, for instance.
Most relevant here is the rather scrappy way in which Parmenides himself
' Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, trans. G. R. Morrow and J. M. Dillon
(Princeton 1987) xxxviii-xliii.
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has been quoted. On p. 665 the three short quotations from B8 are out of
order; on p. 708 two of the same snippets of B8 have B5 (whose
genuineness is less than certain)^ in between them; at p. 1152 we meet
seven tiny quotations, the five from B8 this time being in the correct order,
but with an impossible version of B3 between B8. 30 and B8. 35-36; B4. 1
then follows.'* The total number of lines quoted in whole or part (excluding
uncertain allusions) amounts to only 21 (9 of these from B8. 25-36), but
some lines appear three or more times (B8. 4, 25, 29, 44). It is clear that
Proclus had remembered certain favourite phrases, and one doubts whether he
was referring to any text, except possibly at p. 1 134, where a passage of
four lines (!) is quoted; even here either Proclus or the scribes have failed us
in the last line. Likewise there is no need to suppose that he is referring at
any point to the alleged work of Zeno. Certainly he knows something
about it, and he may well have had access to it, and read it in the past. But I
do not find anything in the text which requires that he should be consulting
the work as he writes. Furthermore, if we bear in mind that earlier
interpreters had made use of the Forty Logoi, much of Proclus' material on
the work could plausibly be attributed to borrowings from earlier
commentaries. One which he had certainly used is that of Plutarch of
Athens, whose work on earlier interpreters Proclus evidently admired (p.
1061. 18-20).^ We should not allow any admiration for Proclus as a
philosopher, or even for the doxographic material in other commentaries, to
lead us to suppose that his reports will be either original or reliable in this
commentary.
^ See G. Jameson, "'Well-Rounded Tmlh' and Circular Thought in Parmenides," PhronesLs 3
(1958) 15-30; cf. Tarrant, Apeiron 17 (1983) 82 n. 21.
* There is a reasonable chance, however, that B4 is placed correctly after B8, since P. J.
Bicknell, "Parmenides B4," Apeiron 13 (1979) 1 15, argues that it comes at the aid of the poem;
I have defended this view in Apeiron 17 (1983) 73-84, though I do not anticipate widespread
acceptance of it. As for B3, or what seems in Proclus to be B3, its position between B8. 30 and
B8. 35 is intriguing, given that B8. 34 signifies the identity of thinking and thinking "it is"
while B3 signifies the identity (for the Neoplatonist at least) of thinking and being. This may
suggest that B3 originally arose from an inaccurate paraphrase of B8. 34; or that B8. 34, which
either Proclus or the source has before his eyes, brought to mind B3. In that case B3 would
have been some way away from B8 in the text, otherwise the commentator would have referred
to the correct version and made sure that he had the correct text, for it could scarcely have
escaped him that what he gave did not scan.
^ Here one must note that interpreters prior to Plutarch of Athens are not named in this
commentary. This namelessness is not Proclus' policy, since Plutarch and Syrianus are clearly
identified, Plutarch by name (1058) and Syrianus by the phrase "our master." Moreover Proclus
has no qualms about identifying earlier commentators in other works. Thus one might assume
that the policy of anonymity had in fact been that of an important source of Proclus'
information on early commentators; if this were Plutarch of Athens, then it would explain why
he is the first to be named by Proclus. I cannot agree with Dillon (above, note 1) that Plutarch
did not produce a written commentary; how else could Proclus have written p. 1061. 13-22?
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Old Interpreters and Zeno's Arguments
Proclus believed that the Forty Logoi were useful for explaining a number
of loci at Farm. 127d-31b. Some, however, had gone a great deal further,
and they had argued that a work of Zeno, identified by Proclus at least with
the Forty Logoi, was crucial to the understanding of the Parmenides as a
whole. These persons, who seem to have been the earliest group of the four
whose interpretations are discussed at p. 630. 37 ff.,*^ believed that Plato
pursued his rivalry with other schools in three ways: by polished imitation
(as in the Menexenus), by direct opposition (as in the Parmenides), or by a
combination (as in the Phaedrus).
The theory behind their interpretation of the Parmenides as anti-
Zenonian polemic is as follows:
For whereas he [Zeno] had attempted to catch out those who posit many
beings in many ways, so that his refutation extends to forty arguments
which bring opposite attributes into corUention, he [Plato] himself
composed his wide-ranging display of arguments with a view to the One,
contending against him who had exercised against the plurality of beings,
and showing in the same fashion as him the opposite attributes accruing to
the same subject; and as he criticised the many by showing that the same
things were similar and dissimilar, same and different, and equal and
unequal, it is along the same lines, they say, that Plato too shows the One
similar/dissimilar and not-similar/not-dissimilar, same/different and not-
same/not-different, and so on in every case: both asserting and denying the
conflicting attributes, and not merely asserting them as Zeno had done. By
these means he showed his richness of argument to be far greater than that
which in Zeno's hands had so sturmed the others that the sillographer
[Timon] called him "double-tongued," and, in delight at the man's powers,
spoke of Zeno's "great strength, not easily exhausted." So what utterance
would he have let fly conceming the man who had multiplied the methods
of his discoveries, when he caUed Zeno double-tongued?
(pp. 631. 36-32. 23)
^ I lend to disagree with Dillon (above, note 1) on the identity of the first two groups of early
commenutors. Identifying "Alcinous" with Albinus, Dillon feels that Albinus made positive
logical use of Farm, at Didasc. 6, and hence that he is typical of group 2. But group 2 see Idea-
theory as critical (p. 633. 16-18), and Galen had given the work an Idea-related purpose
(Damascius, V. hid. fr. 244), while still including it among logical works (see the four
compendia coupled with that of Farm., P. Kraus and R. Walzer (eds.), Galen, Compendium
Timaei Platonis [London 1951] 1). Moreover, logical examples in Didasc. 6 do not mean that
the work's purpose was necessarily regarded as "logical," and Farm, may be behind a liule
negative theology in Didasc. 10. As for Albinus, by explicitly placing the logical dialogues in
the "zetelic" class rather than the hyphegelic group (called by Proclus, In Farm. 631. 4,
"aporetic" and "hegetic" respectively), he seems thus far to be allied with Proclus* first group of
commentators, whose views we are discussing (see Albinus, Frol. 6. p. 151. 6 Hermann). There
is nothing, however, to suggest that he would have been their principal spokesman. In Farm. p.
862. 35-39 appears to refer to the same group, who see Plato and Pamienides as less than happy
with Zeno's woik; less clear is whether they or group 2 are in mind at pp. 1051. 40-52. 3.
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Proclus has included much unnecessary material about the views of
these interpreters, not merely the talk of Timon but also details of their
interpretations of the Menexenus (631. 21-34) and Phaedrus (632. 23-33.
12); it is scarcely possible that he is not following them, or some reliable
source for them, in some detail; this is confirmed by the fact that the whole
passage, apart from the final rhetorical question, is expressed by means of
the accusative and infinitive, thus ruling out the possibility that any
substantial portion of the text expresses Proclus' own view.
The claim is made that Plato, presumably in hypotheses 1 and 2 of the
final part of the Parmenides, imitates Zeno, arguing for the application of
the same opposite attributes to the One that Zeno had applied to the many;
the claim is made that Plato is even more thorough than Zeno in that,
besides arguing for Fx and Gx, where G is F's opposite, he argues also for
(-F)x and (-G)x. It is a fact that in many cases hypothesis 1 (137c4 ff.)
dissociates the One from both opposites of a pair (138b7-41a4), while
hypothesis 2 (142bl ff.) predicates both opposites of the One (145e7 ff.).
The question is whether Plato is consciously trying to outdo Zeno's
arguments, constantly dealing with the same predicates, and constantly
using Eleatic techniques against the Eleatics.
The fact that such an interpretation could be argued in antiquity means
that the book attributed to Zeno must have been compatible with this
thesis; the fact that the interpretation eventually fell from grace meant that
the book did not establish every detail of the interpretation. Initial
opposition was based on the claim that Platonism regards Eleatic monism
as an ally, and that Plato's respect for Parmenides extended also to his pupil
Zeno (pp. 633. 14-34. 5). It could deny that the hypotheses were evidence
of anti-Eleatic polemic; it may not have denied that they imitated and
surpassed Zeno's own arguments. The passage quoted might indeed suggest
that Proclus was happy with such a claim; for whether or not the rhetorical
question is his own, he need not have included it, and by doing so he
appears to sanction this aspect of the interpretation.
The extract seems to tell us three things about Zeno's book: (i) that it
contained 40 logoi\ (ii) that the logoi were arguing for opposite conclusions
concerning the hypothetical many; and (iii) that three pairs of opposites
attached to the many were similar/dissimilar, same/different, and
equal/unequal: probably in that order. This agrees with what Proclus tells
us elsewhere: on p. 694. 23 ff. the arguments are said to be 40, and we hear
of similar/dissimilar (the first pair in the testimony of Plato, 127de),
one/many, rest/motion, equal/unequal (619. 30 ff., 769. 22 ff.), if not of
same/different. The early pages of the Parmenides would have suggested
similar/dissimilar, one/many, and rest/motion (see 129d8-el), but not
same/different or equal/unequal. What seems uncertain is whether the Forty
Logoi was made up of arguments for 2 x 20 predicates or 2 x 40 predicates.
The text at Parm. 127d7 would actually suggest something more
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complicated than either possibility: it talks of the first "hypothesis" of the
first "logos," and one might readily identify this "hypothesis" with the
argument that if there are many, they must be both similar and dissimilar,
and since this is impossible there are not many. Could there have been a
number of hypotheses for each logos, each of them constituting a separate
argument, and thus bringing the total of arguments (as opposed to logoi) to
well in excess of 40, and the predicates perhaps to well over 80?
Proclus seems to be somewhat confused by what he finds in Plato, and
it is likely that he was himself puzzled by Plato's expression, "the first
argument's first hypothesis." At 694. 25 he remarks that Socrates has taken
separately one of the first logoi. Why such imprecision? He goes on to set
out the logos in roughly the same fashion as "Socrates" had done at el-4:
"if there are many beings, what is the same thing will be similar and
dissimilar; yet this is impossible, that the same thing should be similar and
dissimilar; thus there are not many beings." This he refers to as the whole
logos, and he states that it is composed of three hypotheses, apparently
using the term hypothesis as the equivalent of "premiss"; there are said to be
two conditional premisses and a minor premiss, followed by a conclusion
(695. 5-14):
H(C1): If there are many beings, that which is the same
thing is similar and dissimilar.
H(C2): If the same thing is not similar and dissimilar,
there are not many beings.
H(MP): The same thing is not similar and dissimilar. *
C (unstated): There are not many beings.
It is odd that Proclus finds it necessary to regard H(C2) as a separate
premiss, since it is merely an inversion of H(C1). Is he merely trying to
divide up the argument into as many premisses as possible? Is he doing so
with reference to the actual book of Zeno? Or with reference to the work of
some predecessor who had the book ascribed to Zeno available? I believe
tliat what we are offered is neither a complete guess nor a competent
appraisal of the Eleatic text and its relationship to the lemma. The structure
of this kind of Zenonian argument can be observed in the fragments in
Simplicius (Bl-3). It should immediately be obvious that Zeno would
regard H(C1) as something which two arguments will have to show, and
that these arguments will be what requires Zeno's ingenuity. Once they
have been completed he only needs to reiterate these fmdings in the fashion
of either H(C1) or H(C2), appeal to H(MP), and state C. Prior to the
argument we should expect a statement of what it is intended to prove, and
while this might plausibly take the form of the outline given by Socrates at
127eI-4, what we meet in Zeno B3 is simply, "If there are many, the same
things will be both limited and unlimited"; or in B2, "If there are many.
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they are both great and small; so great as to be infinite, so small as to be
sizeless." I suggest that such claims could indeed be called "the first
hypothesis" of the argument, but not so much in the sense of "premiss" as
in the sense of "proposition to be demonstrated"; each argument would have
its own particular proposition to be demonstrated (that if there are many, the
same thing would have to be both F and G, where F and G are opposite
predicates), and this proiX)sition would then supply the major premiss for
the second part of the argument, where the proposition to be demonstrated is
common to all (that there are not many).
One cannot improve upon such an interpretation of the term hypothesis
here by comparing its use with other occurrences in the Parmenides. At
128d5 the hypothesis of Zeno's opponents is simply "if/that there are
many"; at 137b3 Parmenides' hypothesis is "if/that there is One." At 136a5
it is clearly in the conditional form, "if there are many," as also at 136bl-2.
A variety of translations such as "premiss," "assumption," "proposal,"
"starting-point" or even "thesis" suggest themselves in some or all of these
cases, but none can be applied without difficulty at 127d7: particularly if
one asks oneself how the arguments can have had a plurality of
"hypotheses" rather than the one "hypothesis"
—
"if/that there are many."
One might be tempted to question the received text, since some modem
translations do not render the "first ... of the first . . ." in full: thus
Jowett gives "the first thesis of the treatise," while R. E. Allen gives "the
hypothesis of the first argument."'' There is, however, not the slightest
doubt that Proclus had our text here.
If I have been correct to take the use of "hypothesis" at 127d7 as
meaning "proposition to be demonstrated," then is it likely that Proclus was
familiar with the Forty Logoil We ought, I think, to assume that even if
the Logoi were a forgery they would have followed the pattern associated
with Zeno. Proclus is perhaps taken aback by a use of the term different
from its established uses in logic and from other uses in the Parmenides.
Yet he is able to realise that Socrates gives more than the initial hypothesis
at 127el^, and to identify "the first hypothesis" with the correct element, if
for the wrong reasons. The worrying feature is that it is to Plato's text, as
p. 696 shows, that he has turned for help, and it is Plato's text which has
led him to seek further "hypotheses" in further premisses, whereas he would
have turned to the supposedly Eleatic text if he had actually been writing
with it at his side. He may have read the work in the past, but he is no
more anxious to check it now than he is to check the text of Parmenides
himself.
^
R. E. AUen. Plato's Parmenides (Oxford 1983) 4. On p. 69 Allen claims that the
arguments of the treatise "Contained 'hypotheses,' ... of which this paradox is one (127d),"
implying, I suspect, acceptance that there were a number of arguments, called "hypotheses," for
eadi logos.
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Forty Logoi and Hypotheses 1-2
Plato's text, interpreted in any sensible fashion, gives some support for the
idea that each logos is a unit incorporating two contrary arguments, and
trying to show that their conclusions are irreconcilable. If there were forty
logoi of this kind, then there were forty antinomies, each apparently
attaching two opposite predicates to the proposed many. Indeed, to
postulate any more pairs of opposites than this would tend to conflict with
the passage which we have quoted from Proclus, where it is claimed that
Plato's response (at 137c-55e) was far more thorough and detailed than the
Zenonian original. There is no proof, however, that the work known to
Plato could not have consisted of just twenty antinomies, for logos need not
necessarily have been used in Uie same sense by Plato as by Proclus'
predecessors. In my view the extract quoted suggests that Plato had tried to
attach to the One no fewer groups of predicates than "Zeno" had done. Any
attempt to outdo Zeno in the way envisaged by them would have failed if
Plato was unable to apply to the One nearly all pairs of predicates which
Zeno had applied to the many. How many pairs, then, are to be found in
Plato's examination of the One?
The question is not entirely straightforward, because Plato's arguments
are not presented in pairs. One must usually search in hypothesis 2 for the
material which might be held contrary to material in hypothesis 1. The
predicates attached to the One in hypothesis 1 are as follows:
1. not many (137c), not one (141 e)
2. not being whole, not having parts (137cd)
3 . having neitlier beginning nor middle nor end ( 137d)
4. unlimited (spatially) (137d)
5 . neither curved nor straight ( 137de)
6. not in space, neither in self nor in another (138ab)
7. neither moves nor rests (138b-39b)
8. neither same as self or another, nor different from self or another
(139b-3)
9. neither similar to, nor dissimilar from, itself or another
(139e-^0b)
10. neither equal nor unequal to itself or another (140b-d)
11. neither older nor younger than itself or another, nor of the same
age(140e-41a)
12. not in time (141a-d)
13. was not, is not, will not be, becomes not, will not become, did
not become (141de)
14. has no being (141 e)
15. has no name (142a)
(16?). has no logos (142a)
(17?). has no way of being known (142a)
(18?). has no way of being perceived ( 142a)
(19?). has no way of being opined (142a)
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It is obviously possible to count in a slightly different fashion. The
final five predicates appear in just one sentence, and could be counted as one;
one might divide up no. 13 into being and becoming, though the text
suggests that the division into past, present, and future would be preferable.
Many of the predicates appear in groups of two or more negations, which
could not simultaneously be applied to one normal entity. Thus there is
internal paradox. Predicates 2-A, 12 and 14-19, however, are not
paradoxical in themselves, but conflict with predicates applied to the One by
hypothesis 2, generating what we may call a second-level paradox. Each of
the 19 (or 15) topics has contrasting material in hypothesis 2, and one fresh
topic is there added to produce an additional internal paradox. The number in
brackets in what follows indicates the order of the topics' reappearances in
hypothesis 2:
1. is unlimited, many, and one (143a-45a) (3)
2. is a whole with parts (142c-e, 144b-45a) (2)
3. has beginning, middle, end (145ab) (5)
4. spatially limited (though numerically not, 144e-45 a) (4)
5. has shape, curved, straight or mixed (145b) (6)
6. both in itself and in another (145b-e) (7)
7. both moves and rests (145e-^6a) (8)
8. both same as itself and others, and different from itself and
others (146a-47b) (9)
9. both similar to, and dissimilar from, itself and others (147c-48d)
(10)
. . . touches itself and others, and does not touch itself or others (148d-
49d) (11)
10. equal to, more than, and less than itself and others (149d-51e)
(12)
11. older than, younger than, and same age as itself and others (151e-
55e) (14)
12. partakes of time ( 15 le-52a) (13)
13. was, is, will be, became, becomes, will become (155d) (15)
14. partakes of being (142b) (1)
15. has name (155d) (19)
(16?). has logos i\55d) (20)
(17?). isknown(155d) (16)
(18?). is perceived by senses (155d) (18)
(19?). is opined (155d) (17)
It will be seen that, while there are many similarities of order between
the treaunent of the nineteen topics in hypothesis 1 and that in hypothesis
2, some adjustments have been made by Plato, in order to achieve more
effective presentation of the material: not so much in respect of the internal
order of topics 11-12 and 15-19 which may be treated together in any case,
but rather in respect of topics 1-4. The new topic added by hypothesis 2 is
complete in itself, and it is difficult to imagine how any further contrast
could have been achieved by adding further material to hypothesis 1. There
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is internal paradox once again in the case of topics 6-11 and 1, but other
predicates only contribute to a paradox in conjunction with corresponding
material in hypothesis 1.
It could plausibly be argued that Plato has used twenty topics for the
development of p)aradoxes (though some yield both internal and second-level
paradoxes, as our commentators had noticed). The topics include all those
known to have been employed by '*Zeno's Forty Logoi" (9, 8, 10, 1, 7), and
others which might be held to be reminiscent of Zeno himself (compare 4
with B3, 6 with A24, and perhaps 18 with the millet-seed paradox of A29).
The fact that one can identify twenty topics in hypotheses 1-2 while
forty logoi were present in the work of Zeno known to Proclus may be an
accident; but it may not be. It is quite likely that the interpreters referred to
at pp. 631-32 did believe that Plato had tackled the same topics as Zeno but
in greater detail; certainly they believed in a very considerable overlap of
topics. With such a belief they might perhaps have tried to reconstruct the
work of Zeno which they supposed Plato to have used, and this may be the
work which Proclus knew. Such a reconstruction of the supposed Zenonian
original should perhaps have argued, in some order, that the many were:
1. one and many (see /n Parm. pp. 620, 760, 769, 862)
2. wholes and parts
3. with/without beginning/middle/end
4. unlimited/limited spatially
5. with/without shaf)e (curved/straight)
6. contained/not-contained in some space (cf. A24)
7. inmotion andatrest (see/nParm. p. 769; cf. A13)
8. similar and dissimilar (see In Parm. pp. 620, 725, 760, 769)
9. same and different (see In Parm. p. 632)
10. touching/not-touching
11. equal and unequal (see In Parm. p. 620)
12. older and younger
13. in time and not in time
14. gaiCTated and ungenerated
15. existing and not-existing
16. with/without a name
17. with/without a logos
18. known and unknown
19. perceived and unperceived by senses
20. opined and not opined
It need not have required outstanding ingenuity to devise a passable
pseudo-Eleatic work arguing that these groups of predicates must be applied
to the many, and there is little doubt that those who saw the Parmenides as
an attempt to outdo Zeno either had access to some such work or devised
one. If we adhere rigidly to these topics, then it will be much more difficult
to allow that the work was genuine, for it is difficult to see how Bl-2 and
B3 could have belonged to it; and few scholars will be prepared to doubt
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what Simplicius has offered us rather than what Proclus gives evidence of.
There is a difference between our requirement 4 and the subject of B3, since
this latter is talking of limited and unlimited number, not size; and though
an argument for unity and (unlimited) plurality is our first requirement,
Proclus has produced a different "Zenonian" unity/plurality argument at 760.
25 ff., and suggests later (p. 862) that Zeno, in such a context, somehow
talked of whiteness (and blackness?) being present both to us and to the
Antipodeans, just like night and day.* So B3, 1 fear, would have to have
been a separate element in the Forty Logoi. B2, which talks of the many
being great (even infinite) and small (even sizeless), can likewise not be
identified with any of our required arguments. It is true that greater and
smaller do feature in the discussion of equality and inequality at 149d ff. in
hypothesis 2, as also at 140c in hypothesis 1, but here they are subordinate
to equal and unequal. They also feature in a less subordinate role in
hypotheses 5 (160a5), 6 (161de), 7 (164d), and 8 (164^-65a), so that there
would have been some incentive to claim that great and small had featured in
the work of Zeno.
The assumption that the Forty Logoi build twenty antinomies along
the same lines as antinomies detectable in hypotheses 1 and 2 thus seems to
lead to the conclusion that the Forty Logoi was incompatible with our
knowledge from elsewhere of Zeno's arguments against plurality. Either it
must have been a forgery, or, much less likely, it must have been a different
genuine work from that used by Simplicius.
A Case for Authenticity?
Perhaps, however, we are applying the idea of Plato's having used Zeno's
topics far too rigorously. Is it likely that Zeno would have argued
separately on the topics of knowledge, sensation, opinion, name and
definition of the many? Certainly there is a tendency for Plato to mention
carefully all five topics, even in hypothesis 7 (164b 1-2), but it is in the
course of a single argument; if all had been tackled by Zeno (or "Zeno"),
they could have been tackled there too as one argument. That would leave
space for four more Zenonian arguments which did not find any exact
counterpart in Plato, or not at least in hypotheses 1 and 2: unlimited
number finds its way into hypotheses 4 (158b) and 8 (164d), though limited
number, as distinct from unity and definite plurality, does not. And great
and small feature in hypotheses 5-8, if not in the uncompromising fashion
of Zeno's B2. Plato might easily have tried to fuse certain Zenonian topics
if he thought them closely interrelated; perhaps he thought it undesirable to
have too much material on size, number and finity. Thus there is still a
chance that the Forty Logoi, even if they consisted of just twenty
* See below on this passage; I in fact relate it to an argument for sameness and difference.
For a different view see Dillon's earlier article on this fragment, AGPh 56 (1974) 127-31.
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antinomies with a close relation to the topics of hypotheses 1 and 2, could
have stemmed from Zeno himself or have epitomized Zeno's work.
There may also be a point in favour of the work's having been genuine,
assuming only a rough correspondence between the latter part of the
Parmenides and the forty arguments. Early interpreters of the dialogue seem
to have known of a work of forty arguments purporting to be by Zeno;
Proclus gives evidence of having seen such a work; Elias In Categ. p. 109.
6 (Busse) also speaks of forty attempted proofs in support of the non-
existence of the many, and five proofs elsewhere in support of the non-
existence of motion, and he would appear to have been an independent
witness. Is it then likely that Simplicius, at the end of a chain of
commentators who knew the Forty Logoi as Zeno's, would have drawn his
Zenonian proofs against plurality from any other source than this? Had the
genuine work come to light? Or had Simplicius found these arguments in a
much earlier source? It might be easier to assume that he found them in
precisely the same book of anti-pluralistic arguments as other Neoplatonists
knew.
As soon as one allowed that the fragments preserved by Simplicius
could have been part of the Forty Logoi, one would be forced to grant that
work a greater respect. The fragments are surely more complex than a forger
need have made them, and in particular the argument of which Bl and B2 are
parts seems surprisingly intricate. Moreover one could discount the desire
to create a work which conformed with a particular view of the hypotheses 1
and 1 as a motive for forgery. If a reconstruction did not have such a
motive, then how was it that its content was related so closely to the
content of hypotheses 1 and 2, as well as to what we heard earlier in the
Parmenides about Zeno's book and to the report of it at Phaedrus 261d?
Furthermore, upon close examination, it may prove that the very
passage which seems most obviously to challenge the theory of Zenonian
authorship actually suggests authenticity, I am referring now to In Farm.
862. 26-63. 25, of which Dillon only makes much use of the first few lines
in his discussion. Firstly, I wish to note that once again Proclus is not the
first to have noticed a connexion between part of the Parmenides (Socrates'
analogy of the day at 131b) and an aspect of Zeno's book (here an alleged
use of the analogy of whiteness, somehow connected with day and night).
He disapproves of the position taken by certain persons (anti-Zenonians
again), that Plato has Parmenides refute Socrates' day-analogy to avoid the
embarrassment of refuting a similar example used by his own pupil (p. 862.
35-39). Secondly, I wish to draw attention to pp. 862. 39-63. 2, where it
says that Parmenides could have challenged Zeno over the analogy before he
had read his discourse; this means that the analogy was assumed to be part
of the work supposedly ready by Zeno at 127c, i. e. the Forty Logoi.
34 Illinois Classical Studies, XV. 1
I quote the Morrow-Dillon translation at 862. 26-34:
... for Zeno, in his endeavour to show that the many participate in some
one, and are not devoid of one, even though greatly separated from each
other, has said in his discourse that whiteness is present both to us and to
the antipodes, just as night and day are.
And again at 863. 23-25:
... in the way of the whiteness that is both in us and in the antipodes, and
the latter is obviously what Zeno had likened to day and night.
Now there are four points against seeing this analogy (however it
worked) as Zleno's own:
(i) the seemingly Platonic participation-language;
(ii) the vivid imagery in what otherwise might have seemed a very
abstract writing;
(iii) doubts as to whether the concept of Antipodeans would have been in
circulation at around 450 B.C.;
(iv) the apparent incompetence of the analogy, bearing in mind that
Antip>odeans are precisely the people who cannot be experiencing
day or night at the same time as we are.
Proclus' ability to Platonize pre-Platonic writings when he chooses, and to
understand their purpose in relation to the supposed truths of Neoplatonic
philosophy, should not be doubted. As we have seen, one must not expect
Proclus to have the Zenonian work at his side for consultation. His defence
of Zeno's analogy at 863. 2-21 rehes upon its having been Zeno's intention
to demonstrate the unity of immanent form, as opposed to transcendent: as
unlikely a purpose for a pseudo-Eleatic forgery as for Zeno himself. What
the terminology of participation conceals, I think, is that Zeno was trying
to demonstrate not the unity but the sameness of the whiteness in us and
whiteness in Antipodeans.
The vivid imagery would be more of a problem if we did not possess
the paradoxes on motion, which R. E. Allen seeks to exclude from the work
against plurality precisely because of their vividness.' Zeno could be vivid,
and we have nowhere near enough information on the work against plurality
to doubt that he could have been there. Furthermore, my reconstruction of
the argument will not make it quite as vivid as one might be expecting from
Proclus' account.
The notion of somebody standing antipous, i. e. at the very opposite
side of a spherical earth, appears in Plato's Timaeus (63a) and in a related
' See Allen (above, note 7) 69; in the end I cannot accept this argument for the separateness
of the motion-paradoxes. Note that, if early commentators were right to view hypotheses 1-2 as
a response to the anti-pluralistic woiks, hypothesis 3 (or the corollary to hypotheses 1-2 if it is
so viewed, 155e-57b) which deals principally with problems of motion and change, coming to
be and passing away, might be some kind of response to the motion paradoxes; this might make
the view that they were a corollary to the anti-pluralistic arguments attractive.
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passage of the Aristotelian De Caelo (4, 308a20). Much of the material in
Timaeus' account of the workings of the physical universe is drawn from
the Presocratics, and the antipodes do occur in the account of Pythagorean
doctrine given by Alexander Polyhistor at D, L. 8. 26. The Ionian
opponents of the western-Greek spherical earth would surely have noticed
the satirical potential of the notion of people who walk the opposite way up
to the Greeks, and the notion of a spherical earth was found in Parmenides'
cosmology (Al, A44). Any attempt by Zeno to show the Antipodeans to
be the same as us might therefore have had the additional purpose of
removing the sting from an Ionian weapon against western cosmology.
The incompetence of the analogy can only be proven if we know how
the analogy was used. Certainly Socrates uses the example of a single "day"
which embraces (people in) many places. It is a fact that the same "day"
(where "day" is opposed to "night") cannot embrace both us and those who
are antipodean to us. There is little chance that this would have escaped the
notice of those who understood about the moon's reflected hght. "Day,"
"night," and "white-appearance" too will be different for us and for the
Antipodeans in so far as they occur at different times. One horn of a
dilemma will be readily available, and the challenge of finding a counter
argument will appeal to an Eleatic Palamedes.
What was the counter-argument which he produced? Proclus preserves
what appears to be part of the hypothesis of the argument:
(Hj) "The many participate in some one, even if they stand at the
greatest distance from each other." (862. 29-30, my translation)
.
Removing the participation-language, we are left with:
(H2) (If there are many), they are the same, even if they are maximally
divCTse.
This might be opposed to:
(HB) (If there are many), they are different, even if they are as close as
j)ossible.
One then concludes the argument:
thus if there are many they are both the same and not the same;
but this is impossible; therefore there are not many.
The ambiguity in Kotv ei SieiaxTiKei TioppondTco dcTt' aXkr\k<ov can be
made use of by Zeno. The Antipodeans are the furthest people from
ourselves, but they might also be thought to be most different, completely
inverted human beings in an inverted cosmic situation. But of cotu^se Zeno
cannot just say "even if they are most different" while maintaining that the
same things cannot be different. Thus an expression indicating maximal
distance but with implications of considerable unlikeness is just what he
wants.
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Having chosen two peoples most diverse, he takes something which
cannot be present to them simultaneously: whiteness. The exact meaning
of this term here is doubtful, but it would be more appropriate for it to
mean "lighuiess" or even "daylight" than to be restricted to the colour white,
for only then does the connexion with day and night become apparent
Now lightness for the Antipodeans is that which is present only during the
day;
but lightness for us is that which is present only during the day;
thus lightness is the same for us as it is for the Antipodeans, even though
their lightness and ours are at the greatest possible remove.
Now it is obviously not true that Zeno is making our sharing the same
whiteness with the Antipodeans dependent upon our sharing the same day
(in the sense of being simultaneously embraced by a single day-lit sky); but
if one starts with the conviction that Zeno was using a good philosophic
argument rather than a sophism, as Proclus did, then one might indeed
conclude that he wanted us to share the same lightness with Antipodeans in
the same way as we shared the same day with them. And 131b might have
reinforced his impression that this was so.
There can be no conviction that my argument for the sameness of
whiteness (lightness) for us and whiteness for the Antipodeans is exactly
that of the Forty Logoi. But (i) it seems such as might have produced the
reaction that we find in Proclus at In Farm. pp. 862-63, particularly if
Proclus was not actually consulting the text of "Zeno"; and (ii) it would
agree reasonably well with the pattern of Zenonian arguments reported by
Simplicius. Moreover (iii) it does not involve any incompetence
whatsoever in the choice of the illustration, nor does it make the illustration
particularly vivid. What it does do is to produce an argument which would
have been reasonably at home in the philosophic milieu of the mid-fifth
century B.C., and which is unlikely to have been reproduced by an ill-
informed imitator at a much later date. It could not have been prompted by
the reading of Farm. 131b, though Plato could plausibly have thought of
the example of daylight there after meeting a similar example in Zeno's
text. That Zeno should have used examples involving light and dark is also
highly appropriate, given that these were the principles of Parmenides'
cosmology, and that they also feature prominently in his prologue. ^^
These considerations lead me to conclude, with some reluctance, that
Dillon is correct in supposing that Proclus may have genuine Zenonian
material in mind, even if it had been reworked or epitomized. The use of the
Forty Logoi by commentators clearly had a long history, and it had been
^° B8. 53 ff
., B9. B 12. 1-2; B 1. 9-1 1—whether the prologue depicts a journey from day into
night or vice-versa need not concern us here.
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seen as important for the understanding of the early pages of the Parmenides
and of a large part of its later inquiry into the One.
A Case Against Authenticity
The case for full authenticity has presumed that Simplicius himself is using
the Forty Logoi for his own reporting of Zeno's arguments, but that
assumption entailed the rejection of a close correspondence between the
Forty Logoi and the twenty antinomies detected in the Parmenides. It may
be preferable to assume that Simplicius, rather than using a late compilation
of supposedly Zenonian arguments, had resorted to ancient reports of these
arguments from a good source such as Theophrastus. Such a theory might
be attractive for those who would not wish to see the content of the
Parmenides as being determined as much by a work of Zeno's as by Plato's
independent didactic purposes. In this case one would attribute to the author
of the Forty Logoi a wish to reconstruct Zeno's book, employing (i) the
assumption that the Parmenides is a rigidly anti-Zenonian work; (ii) any
evidence of its content which could be extracted from Plato; and (iii) any
further evidence which could be obtained. Such a reconstruction could have
been presented as an epitome such as one finds in the Pseudo-Aristotelian
MXG, introduced by "Zeno says . . ." or some such words. Its serious
scholarly purpose might mean that it preserved valuable details in parts (as
on the antipodes argument?) alongside much which stemmed from the
unproven conviction that Zeno's work contained twenty antinomies directly
related to hypotheses 1 and 2: for arguments leading to the applicatiofi of
40 predicates had to be found, and those which were not reported in the
sources would simply have had to be invented.
A Non-Conclusion
While the case against authenticity impresses me more than any in favour of
complete authenticity, I must ultimately suggest that Proclus' testimony
should be studied by those interested in Zeno, and perhaps even by those
seeking an explanation of the Parmenides. The evidence against the Forty
Logoi is not yet compelling, and its probable purpose had more to do with
informing us than with deceiving us. It may indeed have contained valuable
information from outside Plato, now obscured by Proclus' rather inadequate
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" It has been useful to discuss this material with David Sedley, Myles Bumyeal, Malcolm
Schofield, and John Dillon himself.

